Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research

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Keywords
affective solidarity, emotional energy, emotional liberation, moral shocks, pride, shame

Abstract
The past 20 years have seen an explosion of research and theory into the emotions of protest and social movements. At one extreme, general theoretical statements about emotions have established their importance in every aspect of political action. At the other, the origins and influence of many specific emotions have been isolated as causal mechanisms. This article offers something in between, a typology of emotional processes aimed not only at showing that not all emotions work the same way, but also at encouraging research into how different emotions interact with one another. This should also help us overcome a residual suspicion that emotions are irrational, as well as avoid the overreaction, namely demonstrations that emotions help (and never hurt) protest mobilization and goals.
Urges: urgent bodily needs that crowd out other feelings and attention until they are satisfied: lust, hunger, substance addictions, the need to urinate or defecate, exhaustion or pain

INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago, emotions were almost entirely absent from scholarly accounts of politics, protest, and social movements. One searched in vain for any mention or index entry (Goodwin 1997, p. 53). In the years since, emotions of every sort have reappeared in research on social movements, in a still-growing flow of articles and books. This review recaps some of what we have learned from that research and theory, identifies some of its limits, and suggests where we might go next.

Emotions are present in every phase and every aspect of protest (social movements and protest overlap sufficiently for me to use the terms interchangeably here). They motivate individuals, are generated in crowds, are expressed rhetorically, and shape stated and unstated goals of social movements. Emotions can be means, they can be ends, and sometimes they can fuse the two. They can help or hinder mobilization efforts, ongoing strategies, and the success of social movements. Cooperation and collective action have always offered an opportunity to think about social action more generally, and the return of emotions is the latest inspiration for doing this.

The intellectual pendulum has swung in the past two decades from structural theories of social movements toward cultural ones that include motivation for action, the meaning of events for political participants, strategic dilemmas and decision-making processes, and the need for a theory of action to complement the theory of structural context developed in the 1970s and 1980s (Jasper 2010a). Virtually all the cultural models and concepts currently in use (e.g., frames, identities, narratives) are misspecified if they do not include explicit emotional causal mechanisms. Yet few of them do.

The emerging subfield of emotions and movements has been limited by several conceptual confusions, reflecting the broader social science of emotions. The first problem is that the traditional but untenable contrast of emotions with rationality persists in the form of other dualisms such as body versus mind, individual versus social, or affect versus emotion (Massumi 2002). We need to recognize that feeling and thinking are parallel, interacting processes of evaluating and interacting with our worlds, composed of similar neurological building blocks. Perhaps in reaction to the residual dualisms, scholars of emotions in movements often concentrate on emotions that help protestors rather than on a full range that help, hurt, or do neither (just as other concepts such as resources or opportunities tend to be portrayed only as good things).

The second problem is that labels for specific emotions are often taken intact from natural language—anger and fear being the most common—but actually cover different kinds of feelings. Anger, for example, can be a gut surge of panic over something in the shadows or an elaborated indignation over the insensitivity of our government. Shame, too, has at least two different forms: one (also observed in nonhumans) based on physical humiliation, a kind of cowing, and the other on a shared moral code that one has violated. As social scientists, we need to build on these natural-language labels—which, after all, deeply shape how people feel and act—but we also need to make better analytic distinctions among them.

A third problem is that statements are made about emotions in general, confounding different types of feeling. The word emotion, like its counterpart in many other languages, covers numerous expressions, interactions, feelings, and labels. Although scholars have suggested that we develop subcategories that correspond better to the different kinds of things termed emotions (Griffiths 1997; Gould 2009; Lefranc & Sommier 2009, p. 292), most continue to observe and theorize one such subcategory while applying the term emotions to it. When their models are misapplied to other kinds of emotion, confusion results. Few blanket statements about emotions as a category can hold up.

To address all three problems, I have elsewhere (Goodwin et al. 2004, Jasper 2006a) presented a crude typology of feelings based on how long they typically last and how they are felt. Urges are strong bodily impulses, hard
to ignore, such as lust, substance addiction, or the need to sleep or defecate (Elster 1999b). Rarely considered emotions but clearly feelings, they can affect politics by interfering with promised coordinated action, so that organizers try to control them (just as torturers use them to break people down). Reflex emotions are reactions to our immediate physical and social environments, usually quick to appear and to subside, and accompanied by a package of facial expressions and bodily changes (Ekman et al. 1972). Most authors adopt reflex emotions—fear, anger, joy, surprise, disgust, shock, and so on—as the paradigm for all emotions, thereby exaggerating the intensity, suddenness, and disruptive capacity of emotions.

Moods last longer, so that we can carry a mood from one setting to another; they differ from other emotions in lacking a direct object (Damasio 2003, p. 43; my typology is not far from his). Moods both condition our reflex emotions and are changed by them.

There are two types of relatively stable, long-term emotions, which are often a background for moods and reflex emotions [Trainin (2009b, p. 194) dubs them “reflexive” as opposed to reflex emotions]. Affective loyalties or orientations are attachments or aversions: love, liking, respect, trust, admiration, and their negative counterparts. They are less tied to short-term assessments of how we are doing in the world and more to elaborated cognitive appraisals of others (although the objects need not be humans). Finally, moral emotions involve feelings of approval and disapproval based on moral intuitions and principles, as well as the satisfactions we feel when we do the right (or wrong) thing, but also when we feel the right (or wrong) thing, such as compassion for the unfortunate or indignation over injustice.

Many general models of emotion are based on one of these categories as an exemplar and apply poorly to the others. The typology also addresses problem 1, described above, because an overemphasis on reflex emotions suggests that emotions are likely to lead us to make mistakes, perhaps even to the point of irrationality. It also helps with problem 2, distinguishing, for example, between shame as a permanent feeling of moral inadequacy (as in caste systems) from reflex shame as a reaction to physical intimidation.

**SOURCES**

Until the 1960s, observers used the obvious emotions of protest to dismiss protestors as irrational or immature; from the 1960s to the 1990s, analysts deny any and all emotions in an effort to demonstrate that protestors are rational (Goodwin et al. 2000). Even culturally oriented scholars concentrated more on cognitive codes than on felt experiences. In the 1990s, the intellectual pendulum began to swing back, with the “return of the repressed.” Scholars of protest drew eclectically on various theories of emotions.

A distinct sociology of emotions had matured in the 1980s, *The Managed Heart* (Hochschild 1983) portrayed the management of emotional expressions according to culturally informed “feeling rules,” especially those imposed by employers in a form of exploitation. This book eclipsed the other main strands of the emerging sociology of emotions: Kemper’s (1978) systematic linkage of emotional reactions to an individual’s position in hierarchies of status and power and Heise’s (1979) affect control theory of how we react to disrupted expectations. None of these influential works was directly concerned with politics, although one of Hochschild’s (1975) earliest discussions of emotion, concerning women and anger, appeared in a feminist volume. Even today, these three traditions have not been applied to political action in a thorough and systematic way (cf. Britt & Heise 2000, Kemper 2001).

Another influence was Collins’s (1975) discussion of the emotional energy generated in collective rituals, labeled “collective effervescence” by Durkheim. As part of Collins’s conflict theory, emotions and attention are values that people compete for, and emotions and solidarities draw people to collective action. Once emotions had returned to the study of social movements, Collins (2001, 3)
2004) and Kemper (2001) both worked out some of the implications of their theories for political action (as discussed below).

In the 1990s, several scholars, working from different theoretical perspectives, began to analyze the emotions of protest. Critiques of rational-choice models were one source because that tradition’s restricted definition of rationality as calculated maximization assumed that individuals tend to be rational and yet left the suspicion that few rational grounds exist for participating as opposed to free riding (Olson 1965). Flam (1990) offered an “emotional man” model to complement both the self-interested models of economics and the moral models of altruism often presented as their opposite. Ferree (1992, p. 32) also criticized the rational-choice tradition for rendering “ambivalence, altruism, and emotional experience” “invisible and irrelevant.” Although a useful exercise in brush-clearing, critiques of rational-choice theory had some limits as a starting point for the analysis of emotions: Critics had to accept much of the language and individualism of their target in order to carry on a dialogue, and interesting theorizing about emotions soon emerged from the rational-choice tradition itself, especially Elster’s work (1999a,b).

Feminism inspired a broader critique, not merely of academic models, but of Western thought more generally, for ignoring, denying, and denigrating the role of emotions in social and political life. Jaggar (1989) and others challenged several dichotomies used to denigrate women: mind versus body, thinking versus feeling, public versus private, and so on (Calhoun 2001). The association of women with emotions is unfair and damaging as a norm but perhaps (for that very reason) accurate as a description. Hochschild insisted that women are exploited by being called upon to do more emotion work than men. “Lacking other resources,” Hochschild (1983, p. 163) observed, “women make a resource out of feeling,” thanks in part to the emotion-management skills they are pressed to develop through childhood gender socialization. (The dichotomies attacked by feminists were sometimes straw targets because women are discouraged from feeling certain emotions, especially anger.) Taylor (1996) and Hercus (1999) brought a feminist analysis of anger suppression to the study of social movements (as well as of other emotional processes; Taylor 1995, Taylor & Rupp 2002).

The emotional analysis begun by feminism was further advanced by the queer turn in social movement studies. In a common pattern in which particular social movements inspire research and theory, feminism’s controversies over sex and sexuality and then ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power) and other groups addressing HIV/AIDS ignited work on collective identity (Taylor & Whittier 1992, Stein & Plummer 1994) and on the culture—eventually the emotional culture—of protest groups (Gamson 1995; Gould 2001, 2003, 2009).

For decades, psychoanalytic theory had offered the only serious tool kit for talking about emotions in politics (e.g., Lasswell 1948, Smelser 1968). Its promise faded in the 1970s and 1980s, as cognitive psychology developed as an alternative (Jasper 2004b). Freud’s hydraulic imagery of libidinal flows [first through the individual (either sublimated or released sexually), then out into social networks] relied on an extreme mind-body conflict that was less and less tenable. Goodwin (1997) nonetheless applied it usefully to dyadic tensions in the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, as internal Huk documents show how leaders struggled to prevent members from leaving to be with their spouses and children—to the extent of allowing men to take “forest wives” in the armed camps. Trade-offs among different objects of affection can have a social basis (limited time and attention) rather than being grounded in bodily drives.

Cultural constructionism offered other useful tools for understanding the emotions of politics, especially by suggesting that emotions are a part of culture alongside cognition and morality (Jasper 1997). Emotional mechanisms could be detected lurking unacknowledged beneath numerous processes otherwise taken as cognitive, such as frame alignment and collective identity, or taken as structural, such
as political opportunities and social networks (Jasper 1998). The cultural approach tends to highlight the rhetorical and performative work that organizers do to construct sensibilities and generate moral shocks that draw people into participation (Alexander et al. 2006, Tilly 2008, Broqua & Fillieule 2009).

To be sure, emotions had not been eliminated entirely from scholars’ vocabularies in the 1970s. Lofland (1982) marveled at the joys of crowds; Gamson et al. (1982, p. 123) described the suspicion, hostility, and anger that contribute to an injustice frame. Missing was a way to incorporate these insights into a broader theory of action. Even Gamson (1992), in calling for a social-psychological approach, failed to include his own work on emotions. A cultural approach promised a view of political action that would recognize emotions in various forms and settings (Jasper 1997), but many culturally oriented scholars go no further than acknowledging emotions (Krinsky & Barker 2009).

A reasonable picture of emotions has emerged in the past decade that social scientists can put to use in empirical research. According to Nussbaum (2001, p. 23), “emotions always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or evaluation.” They are, furthermore, salient or important “to the person’s own flourishing” (p. 30). She steers between the treacherous images of emotions as automatic bodily disturbances or as an overly calculating, reflexive awareness. Emotions are a form of information processing, often faster than our conscious minds operate (Leventhal & Tomarken 1986). They run through various parts of the brain, just as we call cognitions do. They can be observed in fMRI scans, just as more formal thoughts can. They help humans negotiate the world around them. Although I believe this view has limits—it has trouble with moods that are not directly about objects and with affective loyalties that persist over time—it is a fine starting point (and compatible with other theorists, such as Ben-Ze'ev 2000, Marcus 2002, Damasio 2003). Foremost, it suggests that different emotions correspond to different things we care about, different goals we may have.

**GOALS OF POLITICAL ACTION**

Many social scientists either ignore the multiple goals humans pursue or assume they know the most important ones. Positing a single goal eases mathematical computation but removes our ability to observe people wrestling with conflicts among goals. Emotions force us to be explicit about goals, the two being so closely entwined. In a work on strategic engagement, I categorized human goals roughly as reputation, connection, sensuality, impact on the world, and curiosity (Jasper 2006b). We see all these at work in social movements, sometimes driving them forward and sometimes pulling them apart (although curiosity is more important for artistic and intellectual than for political movements, so I shall ignore it here). We observe distinct emotions related to how well we are doing in our struggle for these various goals.

**Reputation**

Reputation is one of the most common human motives: concern for due honor, pride, and recognition of one’s basic humanity (Honneth 1995). Many movements that appear instrumentally interested in power or material benefits are motivated at least as much by a concern for the human dignity that political rights imply (Wood 2003, Jasper 2010b). Pride in one’s identity is not a goal restricted to the mislabeled new social movements of the advanced industrial world.

For years, Scheff (e.g., 1990) has detailed the impact of pride (and its opposite, shame) in different institutional arenas. “Pride generates and signals a secure bond, just as shame generates and signals a threatened bond” (Scheff 1994, p. 3). Unacknowledged shame, in particular, “leads directly to anger, insult, and aggression,” as he demonstrates in explaining the origins of World War I and World War II (Scheff 1994, p. 5). He accounts for Hitler’s appeal to
Pride and shame: moral emotions of self-approval or self-disapproval, which entail a feeling of connection or disconnection from those around one.

Germans of the 1930s by tracing Hitler’s expressions of shame and provides a useful list of verbal and visual cues by which we can observe expressions of shame and anger. When both sides in an interaction harbor unacknowledged shame, escalation and polarization are more likely. Following Scheff, Stein (2001) found signs of shame, especially bypassed shame, in her interviews with Christian antigay crusaders.

Many protest movements revolve around efforts to transform shame into pride. In an essay on gay liberation, Britt & Heise (2000) trace the emergence of pride from shame via affect control processes involving fear and then anger. Gould (2001, 2003, 2009) elaborates on unacknowledged shame and the emergence of pride in the radicalization of gay and lesbian activism in the late 1980s. Movements by stigmatized groups face a strategic dilemma: They are trying to remove the group stereotypes, or even the very categories, that shame them, yet they use these same identities to mobilize supporters; to some extent they are fighting to undermine their own sources (Gamson 1995, Jasper 2010b).

If pride for one’s group is a central goal, humbling one’s enemies is another. Especially after humiliations, revenge can become a primary goal, as in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers (Brym 2007, p. 42). Lebow (2008) has argued for the centrality of honor as a motivation in international politics and in politics generally.

If punishing enemies has historically been a male obsession, driven by unacknowledged shame, the women’s movement and its offspring show the reverse goal of collective action: emotional repair of one’s self-image. Because their premise is that women have been oppressed and injured, many women’s self-help movements have attempted to undo that damage by repairing women’s emotional experience. Faced with the Janus Dilemma (Mansbridge 1986; Jasper 2006b, p. 123), these movements have often specialized in “reaching in” to attend to the needs of their own members rather than “reaching out” to fix the world—or so many critics have claimed (Echols 1990, Brown 1995). Too much internal focus, they say, creates a victim mentality and a politics of resentment.

Others have defended the emotional repair work accomplished in self-help and related movements. Analyzing postpartum depression, Taylor (1996) showed how women who did not have the “right” feelings battled American society’s cheery norms about motherhood. Her student, Whittier (2009), has traced several decades of contention over child sexual abuse. Far from an exclusive focus on internal repair, she found efforts to balance the Janus tradeoff. “The shame that victims felt about having been abused was not simply a psychological artifact, but also a product of social forces. Thus, challenging that shame by undertaking emotional work in self-help groups and speaking publicly about one’s experiences was not simply psychological change, but social change” (Whittier 2009, p. 68). If shame is the central emotion that needs to be reduced, some public effort seems necessary in that shame entails imagining oneself in others’ eyes. Struggles over identities must unfold on two fronts, both internal and external to a group.

Connection

If issues of reputation frequently motivate participation, a feeling of belonging to a group often keeps people there. A sense of belonging is a basic human need, involving emotions of love (Berezin 2001), pride (Scheff 1994), and emotional excitement (Collins 2004). This identification with a group goes beyond Lofland’s (1982) reflex crowd joys, providing affective commitments that tend to persist. Collective identity has been a fashionable topic in recent years, exerting its causal impact through the affective loyalties it generates (Jasper 1998, Polletta & Jasper 2001, Flesher Fominaya 2010). Group loyalties expand an individual’s list of goals to include benefits for the group, beyond any benefits the individual receives as a member of that group. Such goals are not quite self-interest and not quite altruism (Flam 1990).

Other connections can draw people out of collective efforts. Goodwin (1997), as discussed...
above, shows how affections for families and sexual partners can interfere with loyalty and the fulfillment of duties to the collective (also Klatch 2004). These tensions between attachment to the nuclear family and to the rebellion are close to what I term the Band of Brothers Dilemma in strategic interaction: A large group tries to attract an individual’s affective loyalty, but that loyalty often focuses on a sub-unit of the large group, just as soldiers are often most loyal to the members of their immediate fighting unit (Jasper 2004a, p. 13). The same friendship or sexual attraction that might draw individuals into a movement may also prevent them from broadening their loyalty to the entire group.

**Sensuality**

Short-term sensual satisfactions also direct human action: lust that falls short of love; the elimination of pain; the desire for drugs or alcohol or food. Urges like these (much less the negative urges such as the need to sleep or defecate) are not normally motivations for political action. But they can disrupt coordinated action, so that organizers must try to suppress them or provide for their relief. More often, urges enter politics as a form of repression, sometimes even torture. Urges can be manipulated so that we can do nothing until they are satisfied, especially intense pain that eliminates all other awareness (although we can also turn control of our bodies against our captors, as in hunger strikes; Siméant 2009). Sensual motives such as urges privilege the immediate term over longer-term projects, sometimes disrupting the latter, although this does not mean they are irrational.

**Impact**

The desire to have an effect on the world is another great family of motivations, along with the attendant emotions. In social movements, this desire often comes from a moral vision or ideology which suggests that the world should be different from the way it is. In their pleas for support, activists must temper the pleasures of accomplishing an impact with a continued sense of fear, anger, and threat that demands continued action. Ideologies, too, must portray the movement as having history on its side—but only in the end, some day (Voss 1994). The emotions that maintain energy and confidence will be undermined by too great a sense of accomplishment. Hopeful anticipation of an impact is perhaps the greatest spur to action (Gupta 2009). Hope is often the positive pole in what I call moral batteries: the combination of positive and negative emotions that, through their contrast, help energize action (see sidebar).

The frustration of not having an impact, or sometimes not being heard, shows why...
protestors often adopt as targets the governmental procedures that have failed to protect or aid them (on procedural rhetoric, see Gordon & Jasper 1996). Indignation at one’s own government can be especially moving, as it involves a sense of betrayal. At the extreme, violent repression of peaceful protest is a frequent source of moral shock, dubbed “backlash” by Hess & Martin (2006), who also describe techniques used by authorities and protestors in battling over the emotional understanding of the backlash (Martin 2006). Outrage over state repression, far from curtailing protest, can sometimes ignite it (Brockett 2005). One of the deepest satisfactions of collective action is a sense of confidence and agency, an end that in turn becomes a means to further action (Wood 2003). We already begin to see a complex emotional interplay between means and ends (elaborated below): attaining salient goals can demobilize your side through complacency and mobilize your opponents through fear and threat (Jasper & Poulsen 1993).

MEANS OF ACTION
We arouse and display our own and others’ emotions as a way to get things done. Using “sensitizing apparatuses” such as physical props and ritual actions (Traini 2009b), organizers try to arouse emotions to attract new recruits, sustain the commitment and the discipline of those already in a movement, and persuade outsiders. The first task facing organizers is to nudge a person from bystander to participant. If most emotions represent a way of monitoring and evaluating the world around us, then they should help us understand those rare but important moments when people question or abandon routine action in favor of new ways of acting and thinking. These strategic engagements are less frequent than habitual action, but more influential (Jasper 2006b).

Focusing Attention
Emotions help to focus an actor’s attention on one part of the world around her. Political scientists formulate this idea as anxiety, “generated when norms are violated; the more they are violated, and the more strategically central those norms are to people, then the greater the anxiety” (Marcus et al. 2000, p. 138; also Neuman et al. 2007). When people face novel threats, they pay attention, flipping from preconscious routines to more thoughtful information gathering. In other words, on top of a “disposition system” that helps us develop useful habits to which we no longer need to pay much attention, we are equipped with a “surveillance system” that “acts to scan the environment for novelty and sudden intrusion of threat” (Marcus et al. 2000, p. 10). When voters feel threatened, their reflex emotions lead them to seek additional information and process it more thoroughly. (Emotions, especially affective loyalties, also operate in the disposition system, of course.) Their anxieties also help recruit people to new forms of action, including protest. One way that activists try to recruit others is by creating or taking advantage of moral shocks, information or events that [much like the breaching experiments of ethnomethodology (Benski 2005) or the deflections of affect control theory] suggest to people that the world is not as they had thought. Their visceral unease occasionally leads to political action as a form of redress (Jasper 1997). Moral shocks have helped recruit people to the animal rights movement (Jasper & Poulsen 1995), the movement for peace in Central America (Nepstad & Smith 2001, Nepstad 2004), abolitionism (Young 2001), antiracist movements (Warren 2010), and the famous Madres in Argentina (Risley 2011).

As Mika (2006) points out, the strong rhetoric and imagery that may shock a few into activism is likely to deter or even annoy the majority—another case of the Janus Dilemma of reaching in versus reaching out. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) ads, shown to focus groups representing the general public, often conflicted with participants’ basic views of nation or religion, especially since PETA referred to these other values in a glib way. Wettergren (2005) shows how anticorporate activists have tried to administer moral
shocks through ads to the general public, although she does not have evidence about their effectiveness.

Scheff (2006), analyzing a memorial against the Iraq invasion, argues that moral shocks depend on surprise, emotional “attunement” with others (Scheff’s pride), and the acknowledgment of a previously hidden emotion (grief, in his example). But some who see the memorial are only driven further into denial of attunement, i.e., denial of any human connection with our enemy. According to Scheff, conversation with those tending the memorial, especially with Scheff himself, helped those in denial to acknowledge their grief, as did how the memorial is framed (is it about the dead or about the war?). Moral shocks are most often part of a flow of action toward political activism, not a single great leap (Gamson 1992, p. 73). They do not change people’s underlying values; they only clarify or activate them.

**Radicalization**

Gould (2009) suggests another role for moral shocks: They often come to those already participating in a social movement, with the effect of radicalizing them or reinforcing their commitment. In 1986, *Bowers v. Hardwick* had this effect on the U.S. gay and lesbian rights movements (Gould 2009, chapter 2). *Roe v. Wade* had had a similar impact on an attentive—and already antiabortion—portion of the public in 1973 (Luker 1984). Moral shocks can redirect or revivify existing efforts. *Roe* informed an attentive public of how common abortion actually was; *Hardwick* told the lesbian and gay community that their own government supported their oppression. Lowe (2006, chapter 5) suggests that moral shocks are especially likely when someone holds a sweeping movement ideology that takes the form of a “quasi-religion.”

**Rhetorical Display**

Moral shocks are hardly the only kind of rhetoric activists use. As well as recruiting new members, they must appeal to other players and to bystander publics. Some of these appeals deploy emotional displays; others try to downplay emotions. If feminists often challenge the assignment of emotions by gender, in the animal rights movement in rural North Carolina, Groves (1995, 1997, 2001) found groups exploiting those same emotional norms as part of their rhetorical package. Here activists, trying to downplay the emotions of the movement in order to emphasize its rational, professional, even scientific grounding, favored men as spokespersons even though the movement was heavily female. “Being emotional becomes legitimate when men do it, and women can point to men’s participation in the movement to justify the legitimacy of their own feelings about animal cruelty” (Groves 2001, p. 226). In the self-help and animal-protection groups, we see the emotional dynamics of the Dilemma of Cultural Innovation: the dilemma over whether to challenge or to exploit existing views and sensibilities (Jasper 2004a, p. 13). The same women may challenge gendered feeling rules as feminists and exploit them as animal protectionists.

Emotional displays send either threatening or reassuring signals to audiences, depending on what groups want from them. Sometimes emotions must be managed as part of a “cool” style (Stearns 1994). A group praying or singing seems under control; a group shouting or running does not (in affect control terms, its activity level is higher). The two kinds of displays are useful for different purposes, as part of the Naughty or Nice Dilemma: Opponents and authorities may capitulate under threat, or they may redouble their efforts at containment and repression (Jasper 2004a; 2006b, p. 106). The reflex and moral emotions generated in these interactions influence whether repression succeeds or backfires.

In addition to focusing attention, breaking us out of our routines, and persuading others, emotions help explain our continuing participation in collective action. To be sustained, participation must provide some satisfactions along the way. Several emotional mechanisms serve this purpose, including collective solidarities, interaction rituals, and other group dynamics.

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Shared and reciprocal emotions: in a formal or informal group, reciprocal emotions are those the members feel for each other (such as love), and shared emotions are those they have in common toward other objects (such as anger against opponents).

Collective Solidarities

As discussed above, libraries have been written about collective identities and politics, ranging from nationalism (e.g., Calhoun 1997), to American identity politics since the 1960s (Gitlin 1995), to the emergence of LGBTQ movements since the 1990s (Gamson 1995). Once viewed primarily as an exercise in constructing collective memory (Anderson 1983) or the drawing of cognitive boundaries (Taylor & Whittier 1992), recent work on collective identity has examined the affective loyalties involved, especially love of the group (Berezin 2001) and hatred for outsiders (Scheff 1994, Le Cour Grandmaison 2002, Mann 2004). These maintain member enthusiasm.

Groups seem to be strengthened when they share reflex emotions in response to events and when they share affective loyalties to one another (what I call shared and reciprocal emotions, respectively; Jasper 1998), with each one contributing to the other. As a deeply satisfying form of reputation and connection, collective identity is a goal as much as a means—an “emotional achievement” in Yang’s (2000) words. Even negative shared emotions can strengthen positive reciprocal emotions: “Even the experience of fear and anxiety, not uncommon in the midst of protest, can be a strong force in creating a sense of collectivity and be an attractive force in collective actions” (Eyerman 2005, p. 43).

Interaction Rituals

In a synthesis of Durkheim and Goffman, Collins (2001, 2004; also Summers Effler 2006) offers a theory of emotional energy, generated in face-to-face situations, that gives people consciousness of groups and motivation to participate in collective endeavors. His interaction ritual model “explains the relative intensities of the movement commitments” and might also help account for “how social movements periodically gather, in smaller or larger collective occasions, sometimes to recreate the effervescence that launched the movement, and sometimes to infuse new emotions, one of the most effective ways being confrontation with targets or enemies” (Collins 2001, p. 31). If any interaction can generate emotional energy, and if that energy translates into the confidence that aids strategic engagement (Jasper 2006b, p. 108ff), then this is a general and important theory of emotions in politics. It traces reflex emotions as they evolve into moods and ultimately into affective loyalties and occasionally moral emotions.

Moods are at the center of Collins’s model, his “emotional energy.” Drawing on Kemper (1978, 2001), he distinguishes ongoing positions in hierarchies that generate distinctive levels of long-term emotional energy from interactions that change those levels in the short term, linking the two by postulating that those at the top arrange ritual interactions to reinforce their positions. Those with sinking levels of emotional energy get depressed, although those with some level remaining (and hence some capacity for resistance and agency) may also feel afraid (Collins 2004, p. 129). If rituals fail to arouse emotions, perhaps because they are too habitual or too confused, they fail. Unsuccessful interaction rituals discourage participation (Summers Effler 2010, p. 42ff). Moods interact with events to generate short-run reflex emotions.

Collins’s use of Durkheim also suggests some of the mechanisms that generate the reflex joys of crowds. Collective locomotion and music have unusual capacities to make people melt into a group in feelings of satisfaction, perhaps because so many parts of the brain and body are involved at once. Music’s contribution to social movements has often been analyzed as though it were primarily about the cognitive messages contained in the lyrics, full of catchy, memorable ideological slogans (Eyerman & Jamison 1998, Roscigno & Danaher 2004). But music has a strong emotional impact on participants who sing, dance, and move together (McNeill 1995). Of Traíni’s (2008, p. 60) list of 12 contributions that music makes to protest, the first two are explicitly emotional (creating feelings favorable to conversion and helpful emotional postures), and two more (reinforcement of
group identity and demonization of opponents) are rooted in affective commitments.

**Discipline**

In any collective action, individuals must be controlled so that they do what others expect of them. Organizers must anticipate, block, or allow for urges such as thirst or the need to urinate. One reflex disruption is fear, which can paralyze or panic—it was the paradigm emotion for much crowd theory. Goodwin & Pfaff (2001) identify “encouragement mechanisms” that organizers used to mitigate or manage fear in both the U.S. and the East German civil rights movements: intimate social ties and support, emotional mass meetings, identification with the movement, faith in their ultimate victory, shaming, training in civil disobedience, and media coverage. Two additional mechanisms in the U.S. movement were the possession of firearms and faith in divine protection.

Taking a longer perspective, Broqua & Fillieule (2009, p. 164) point out that activists work to suppress emotions as much as to express them, mentioning as an example the 200 years it took to tame and institutionalize street demonstrations [part of Elias’s (1978 [1939]) class-based “civilizing process”]. Like women, the working class had to prove they were rational enough to participate in politics.

**Group Dynamics**

Internal group dynamics, crucial to sustaining any movement, are still poorly understood. Group leaders try to minimize affective loyalties to anyone outside the group and maximize them to the group or its leaders (Goodwin 1997). Owens (2009) shows how the strong emotions over the Janus Dilemma helped destroy the Amsterdam squatters’ movement. Lalich (2004) compared the group Heaven’s Gate, which expected to be transported up to Halley’s comet to start new incorporeal existences, to the Democratic Workers Party, a Marxist-Leninist cellule in the San Francisco Bay Area in the 1970s and 1980s. Both required members to take new names, cut outside ties, and remain silent about prior affective commitments. (Interestingly, both groups discouraged any talk of feelings, even as leaders manipulated affective loyalties.) Emotions that are useful means for group leaders may be damaging to the rank and file as individuals.

The emotional dynamics of leaders and followers are often ignored, part of sociology’s broad inattention to leaders (cf. Barker et al. 2001). Even a cultural analyst like Melucci (1996) views leadership as a series of exchanges between leaders and followers. Scheff (1994) alludes to the role of leaders as symbols of feelings in his analysis of Hitler’s appeal, but he provides little sense of the internal structure of groups and their dynamics. Even a nation, in his model, is relatively undifferentiated.

Describing his method as part/whole analysis, he jumps between nation and individual rather than showing the organizational and strategic work that links them—the stuff of resource mobilization, political alliances, frame alignment, and other organizing work. Emotions are key potential building blocks for moving from the micro to the macro level, although not the only ones.

Kemper’s (1978, 2001, 2006) structural approach should help explain the emotions of group interactions, even if it is not the complete theory of emotions that he would like. Ongoing hierarchies of power and status set up expectations for interactions, and predictable emotions result when they are met or not met. For instance, fear and anxiety result from an insufficiency or reduction in one’s power, and guilt results from an excess or increase in power. His system is complex and works best for reflex emotions in ongoing social systems. Because internal hierarchies, formal or not, develop in protest groups, the theory may work here. It is less likely to work for broader political arenas that lack well-defined hierarchies. Emirbayer & Goldberg (2005) draw on Pragmatism to develop a similar “relational” approach to emotions.
Emotional liberation: a package of emotions that removes blockages to protest, including a shift of affective loyalties from dominant identities and institutions to protest-oriented ones, reflex emotions of anger rather than fear, moods of hope and enthusiasm rather than despair or resignation, and moral emotions of indignation.

THE FUSION OF ENDS AND MEANS
Despite the many ways that emotions are intimately tied to means and to ends, they also frequently blur the very distinction of means and ends. Any flow of action throws up a constant stream of emotions, and the more positive they are—or the more emotional energy and excitement they generate—the more likely participants are to continue. The satisfactions of action, from the joy of fusion to the assertion of dignity—become a motivation every bit as important as a movement’s stated goals. Many authors have pointed out the pleasures and pains of protest, without explicitly acknowledging the emotions that comprise them. Means become goals, and goals—once attained—become the means for further action. Means and ends often fuse. (Because in his view the means are the ends in affective action, Weber placed it in a category of its own, especially in contrast to means-oriented action and ends-oriented action.)

For example many movements aim to transform feeling rules. In the most well-documented case, discussed above, feminists tried to make it acceptable for women to express negative emotions, especially anger. Hochschild (1975) cited Paul Ekman’s finding that women are more likely to suppress anger, whereas men are more likely to mask fear; anger is aimed downward in hierarchies (Kemper 1978). The reason is that anger, as Aristotle insisted, is a useful means for asserting one’s rights and status. Calling self-help “the taproot of feminism,” Taylor (1996, p. 175) argued that “women’s self-help plays a major role in challenging the emotion norms surrounding love and anger and is contributing to an historical shift in American society toward free expression, individualism, and self-development.” The ability to feel and display the emotions associated with political agency—anger, indignation, pride, and so on—represent a kind of “emotional liberation” (Flam 2005) every bit as necessary as “cognitive liberation” (McAdam 1982).

These changes in emotional displays, making them less gendered, have been a central goal of the women’s movement. But the ability to express anger is also a means for challenging injustices, a normal part of most protest movements. [According to Solomon (1971), Mao faced a similar challenge in overcoming peasants’ reticence to express anger.] As gender restrictions are relaxed, women gain new ways to act in their own interests. Again, this pattern is common in social movements (and all strategic engagement): Attaining one objective helps in attaining future ones. For this reason, there has been some confusion about the goals of movements: Is mobilization itself an end or merely a means? It is both, satisfying in itself but also contributing to future action.

Moods are central to this interpenetration of means and ends. Each victory, even a small one, yields confidence, attention, and emotional energy, all of which are advantages for further action (Jasper 2006b, p. 108ff). Collins (2004) observes that emotional energy generated in one interaction gives people confident moods they can take to their next interaction, especially when they create symbols to remind them. These mechanisms can help us make sense of many of the opportunities of political process theory, for instance. An event like Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 was less a signal of the weakness of racist government than a source of hope that victories were possible (Jasper 1997, p. 118). Combined with the subsequent reflex anger from white supremacists, this hope operated as the positive pole of a moral battery.

Anger, outrage, and other aggressive emotions are not always a winning approach. They embroil protestors in the Naughty or Nice Dilemma (Jasper 2006b, p. 106). But protestors are certainly better off facing this dilemma than having their choices constrained because naughty emotional expressions are precluded from the start, making them more predictable to opponents. [Holmes (2004, p. 211) criticizes approaches that “assume that the political outcome of anger is determinable in advance,” but instead of recognizing the strategic dilemmas and the contingency of
strategic interaction she simply labels anger as “ambivalent.”]

Anger comes in moral as well as reflex forms. The kind of anger nurtured by the women’s movement is not the same anger you feel when your cat claws its way up your leg. The latter is a quick reflex, which subsides when you remind yourself that the cat was in turn startled by the dog. Women’s anger is instead a form of righteous indignation, a moral sensibility based on an analysis of injustice as well as a gut feeling of oppression. Women had to learn to turn their blame outward, to see themselves as victims, but also as strong enough to resist. We do not do as much cognitive work when we kick the cat.

If a mood of energy and agency feeds collective endeavors, so does a sense of loyalty to one’s collective. We saw that collective identification is both an end in itself, a basic human satisfaction, and also a means. Pride in one’s group, especially in its moral Worth, Unanimity, size (Numbers), and Commitment [Tilly’s (2004) “WUNC displays,” which he primarily took as oriented toward external audiences but which also has internal audiences], enhances commitment to collective action. To the extent I identify with a group, its goals become mine. But that same identification also aids collective action by giving me the attention and energy to participate. In addition, my ends are an organizer’s means. This fusion of ends and means in collective identity explains why participants can feel despondent or bitter when a movement ends, even when it has attained its stated goals (Adams 2003).

Finally, we can circle back to moral sensibilities. Just as they form the background conditions for reflex emotions (“background emotions,” Nussbaum (2001) calls them), they are also one of the most lasting accomplishments of social movements. Just as one movement may leave for future movements such advantages as know-how, social networks, frames, and other carriers of meaning, it may also leave a way of feeling about the world that later movements can build upon (Jenkins 1992, Nepstad & Smith 2001). In nineteenth-century Britain and America, compassion for animals was borrowed to help create movements to aid poor or abused children; in the following century the same styles of compassion could be applied to distant suffering across the globe.

In sum, the routines of protest must offer satisfactions along the way, especially considering how remote many movement goals are. The pleasures of conversation, the excitement of interaction, the ability to articulate moral intuitions, a sense of making history, and others: these are satisfactions that keep participants going, regardless of the likelihood of obtaining stated goals. Conversely, the attainment of interim goals is one of the most energizing of these pleasures of participation. Emotions are part of a flow of action and interaction, not simply the prior motivations to engage or the outcomes that follow. Because emotions (especially reflex emotions and moods) are sometimes short-term satisfactions, they often conflict with longer-term goals, leading to regret, but regret is not the same as irrationality.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Emotions interact with each other constantly, posing challenges to research outside carefully controlled experiments (and even to many of those). Perhaps the most interesting interaction is between long-standing affective commitments or moral emotions and short-run reflex emotions that tap into those as background. This interaction is the key to a moral shock (Young 2001). But our moods also filter our reactions to information and events. Affective loyalties and moral emotions also interact with each other, as collective identities are frequently defined by shared morals, just as our moral emotions differ for various groups (we are quicker to see moral failings in our opponents, perhaps, than on our own team). We also have moral emotions about our reflex emotions, as when we are ashamed of having reacted inappropriately (Elster 1999a).

Emotions also come in combinations (Flam 2005). Anger tinged with moral shame differs
from anger tinged with indignation, with different implications for action. A combination of a negative and a positive emotion operates as a moral battery driving action forward. We need to understand the rhetoric and practices organizers use to alter these combinations to foster action.

Emotions are also sequenced (Barker 2001). Williamson (2011) speaks of “emotion chains,” giving a temporal dimension to the pairs of emotions found in moral batteries. Examining whether people returned a year later to a Reclaiming camp (a feminist new-age religious movement), Williamson found that an increase in hope during the event increased someone’s chance of returning, whereas an increase in fear lowered it. An initial increase in confusion also increased the odds, reflecting a common religious recruiting technique. Changes in courage had no effect. Summers Effler (2010) also links emotions to long-term trajectories of protest groups.

Another complication is that we can “feel” in different ways. I can have bodily sensations that I am not aware of or on which I do not place a verbal label (Gould 2009, p. 18ff). I can display emotions that I do not feel (Hochschild’s “surface acting”). In this article, I have treated emotions as though they were things with neat labels that we mostly recognize. For all its limits, I see no other starting place because we as analysts must apply linguistic labels. And in fact, when humans label their own feelings, those labels begin to give their feelings shape and direction (Barrett 2006). This is what culture and language do for and to us.

Emotions can be complex, but one thing that should not hinder our study of them is a shortage of research techniques. Almost any technique that has been used to explain cognitive meanings can be adapted to studying emotions. We interpret texts, buildings, gardens, rituals, and other human artifacts for the emotions displayed or aroused in audiences. We observe people in interaction, as well as audio- and videotape them. We interview and survey them. We participate ourselves, so that through introspection we can observe or reconstruct our own complex emotions. We ask subjects to keep diaries of their feelings, or we prod them at certain times for their current emotions. We place them in laboratories or focus groups to observe them interacting with other people or computers. One challenge, as with cognitive meanings, is to line up the feelings that are displayed with those that are felt, and multiple methods are typically best for this.

Emotions are a core part of action and decisions, which we analysts ignore at our peril. Actions, whether consciously made as choices or not, come with long lists of potential risks, costs, and benefits. We need to include the emotional risks, costs, and benefits because these help shape actions and choices. These were excluded from rationalistic traditions as too hard to reckon with, but surely they guide decisions. If we are to understand the actions undertaken, we need to understand the emotions that lead, accompany, and result from them. If political actors care about them, analysts must too.

Emotions, freed from the pejorative mind-body dualisms of the past, promise to advance our comprehension of agents and their motivation. Recent overviews of social movements, in the United States and abroad, have pointed to emotions as key ingredients in any theoretical advance (e.g., Cefaı 2007; Jasper 2007, 2010a). They promise a theory of action to balance the theories of structure that dominated social movement theory and research until recently. Even so-called structures—such as voting systems, well-armed police, or cleavages among elite opponents—operate at least partly through the emotions they arouse. Just as the interpretive turn in social science has allowed us to reenvision the causal mechanisms behind earlier concepts (Jasper 2007), so an emotional vision is helping us find hidden mechanisms beneath many of the concepts we have taken for granted for so long.
FUTURE ISSUES

1. How do reflex emotions interact or depend upon background emotions such as affective
loyalties and moral emotions?

2. What emotions are frequently combined in political action?

3. What sequences of emotions do we find in political engagements? Which are internally
generated and managed by organizers, and which reflect protestors’ interactions with
opponents and other players?

4. What emotional dynamics help us explain how protestors grapple with strategic trade-offs
and dilemmas?

5. How do the emotions of players other than protestors—elected officials, police, oppo-
nents, journalists, and so on—help explain how engagements unfold?

6. What are the emotional constraints on social movements, including those generated by
so-called political structures?

7. Can we rethink the major concepts of past research, such as material resources, politi-
cal opportunities, frames, collective identity, and narratives, in order to find emotional
processes hidden inside them?

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might
be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their extensive comments on an earlier draft I thank the weekly Politics and Protest Workshop
of the CUNY Graduate Center, especially Agatha Beins, Vince Boudreau, Louis Esparza, Olivier
Fillieule, Jeff Goodwin, John Krinsky, Guobin Yang, and Elke Zuern. Kevin Moran provided
needed research and editorial assistance.

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